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安联：疫情将重创今年的全球贸易(2020.05.12) .zhubiaoti {font-family: 黑体;font-size:18pt;line-height:23pt; text-align:center;FONT-weight:800;color:black} .fubiaoti {font-family: 黑体;font-size:14pt;line-height:20pt; text-align:center;FONT-weight:700;color:black} .zhongwen{font-size:12pt;line-height:180%} .yingwen{font-size:13pt;line-height:150%} .tiyao{font-family: 楷体_GB2312;font-size:14pt;line-height:150%} 　　提要：即使在世界各国全面解除封城措施之后，全球贸易额仍可能不及新冠疫情爆发前的90%，而且直至今年下半年才会逐步回升。然而，安联预计各国无法同步解除封城和限制措施，这将导致今年全球商品贸易额和服务贸易额分别损失2.4万亿美元和1.1万亿美元。除疫情影响之外，全球贸易还面临保护主义卷土重来的风险。 　　（外脑精华·北京）即使在世界各国全面解除封城措施之后，全球贸易额仍可能不及新冠疫情爆发前的90%，而且直至今年下半年才会逐步回升。我们估计各国无法同步解除封城和限制措施可能将导致全球商品贸易额下降2.4万亿美元，这等同于全球所有国家将关税税率提升至17%，即接近1994年的关税税率水平。 　　商品贸易和服务贸易分别损失2.4万亿和1.1万亿美元 　　所有国家本应在今年6月全面解除封城措施。不过，在贸易额锐减22.5%后，即便解除封城措施，全球贸易额仍可能不及新冠疫情爆发前的90%的水平。不过，我们继续预期，在制造业复苏之后，全球商品贸易额将在今年下半年期间回升。我们利用计算R0值（基本感染数）的方法，预测了全球所有国家解除封城的实际，并且利用各国商品贸易的份额来估测了国际商品贸易的“解封”进度。我们认为封城的解除（多数国家应在6月末前宣布解除封城）并不意味着一切立即恢复正常。实际上，一些国家将继续实行区域封城，而且只会逐步开放其所有经济行业，而酒吧和餐馆将在解除封城后的未来几个月中继续惨淡运营。我们预计，在今年下半年至2021年期间，全球商品贸易将会回升，从而推动2021年全球贸易总量和贸易总额分别增长10%和15%。 　　我们估计各国无法同步解除封城和限制措施可能将导致全球商品贸易额下降2.4万亿美元，这等同于全球所有国家将关税税率提升至17%，即接近1994年的关税税率水平。即便在解除封城后，关于商品、服务和人员流动的差异化限制解除规则仍可能造成存在不确定性、信息不对称和企业承受监管成本的问题，从而阻碍全球贸易恢复至正常水平。就商品贸易角度而言，解除限制措施方面存在的这种差异性，将导致全球商贸贸易额在2020年底减少1.5万亿美元。这相当于将全球商品贸易税税率上调7%至约13%的水平。我们预计封城的影响以及各国缺乏协调性的逐步解除限制将使新冠疫情导致全球商品贸易额下降2.4万亿美元 （全球服务贸易额下降1.1万亿美元）。总体而言，封城以及解除封城造成的额外损失将相当于全球平均关税税率突然上升11%至近17%的1994年关税税率水平。 　　虽然将会出现U型复苏，但一些特定行业将可能因其对供应链中断的敏感度上升以及库存低于或逼近长期平均水平而面临通胀压力。由于货物交付时间延长以及全球封城导致涵盖全球50%以上GDP的地区的出现若干运输不畅问题，采购经理人指数中的几项“投入品价格”指数在过去几个月中已经飙升。就行业而言，在解除限制期间，计算机及电子产品、金属和采矿、运输、电力设备和纺织品行业最有可能继续遭受供应链中断冲击，因为这些行业依赖外国投入品而且库存水平低下。就各国而言，同中国企业相比，德国、法国、爱尔兰和比利时、荷兰、卢森堡的企业最有可能遭遇通胀压力和供应链中断问题，因为这些国家的企业对外国投入品的依赖度高于其他国家，而且其库存低于或接近长期平均水平。 　　警惕保护主义风险卷土重来 　　最后一点是，是警惕新冠疫情爆发前出现的风险卷土重来：老式保护主义抬头可能将使2019年的不确定性重现，并可能通过促使中美紧张关系升级一致投资复苏；导致新冠肺炎治疗设备贸易额减少300亿美元，从而进一步加剧新兴市场国家和发展中国家的危机。在美国国务卿蓬佩奥重申其此前发表的关于新冠疫情与中国武汉一家实验室有关的言论后，美国已经正式加大对中国的指控。这可能导致美国对中美第一阶段贸易协议提出质疑，由于能源价格暴跌，该协议的条款变得更具挑战性。我们估计，为了遵守该协议，中国今年将不得不增加进口20%的美国能源产品和增加进口3.6%的美国农产品；而今年中国的相关美国产品进口额增长1.8%，比签署该协议时预期的增幅低3倍。此外，预计世贸组织将为欧洲在6月底之前提高与空客和波音案相关的关税税率铺平道路。 　　解除封城和限制措施还导致对新冠肺炎相关产品出口的保护主义措施增多。数据显示，对医疗设备、药品和防护设备（与新冠肺炎相关的产品）的新出口禁令已创纪录的高点水平。今年以来，全球共对这些产品实施了80多项新的保护主义措施，创历史新高，为2019年全年的2.5倍。我们估计，出口禁令将导致今年全球新冠肺炎治疗产品贸易额减少300亿美元。 　　这种针对性的保护主义可能会加剧新兴国家和发展中国家的卫生危机。实际上，巴西、阿根廷和阿尔及利亚，其次是南非、摩洛哥、印尼、哥伦比亚、马来西亚、墨西哥和智利，这些国家的新冠肺炎的相关治疗产品的进口主要源自3个主要合作伙伴国，而且这些国家的这类产品的进口关税税率高于世界其他国家。 　　英文原文： COVID-19 losses equivalent to a return of 1994 tariffs 　　Global trade could remain below 90% of its pre-crisis level even after lockdowns are lifted and only recover gradually in H2 2020. We estimate that lockdowns and the uncoordinated deconfinement could cost merchandise trade USD2.4tn, the same as if all countries hiked their tariffs to 17%, i.e. close to levels last seen in 1994. 　　All countries should have lifted generalized lockdowns by this June. Yet, after a 22.5% shock in value terms, trade could remain below 90% of its pre-crisis level even after lockdowns are lifted. However, we still expect trade of goods to rebound in the second half of the year, following the manufacturing sector recovery. We use the R0, projected end of lockdowns in all countries and the share of each country in merchandise trade to understand at what pace the "lid" on international merchandise trade would be lifted. We see that the end of the lockdowns (which should be announced until end of June in most countries) does not mean an immediate return to normality. Indeed, some countries will continue regional lockdowns, and only gradually open all sectors of their economies, while bars and restaurants would operate at a very low capacity for a few additional months. We expect merchandise trade to recover in H2 2020 and through 2021, pushing the overall growth next year at +10% in volume and +15% in value terms. 　　We estimate that lockdowns and the uncoordinated deconfinement could cost merchandise trade USD2.4tn, the same as if all countries hiked their tariffs to 17%, i.e. close to levels last seen in 1994. Even after the lifting of lockdowns, differentiated deconfinement rules on the movement of goods, services and people could create uncertainty, information assymetry and a regulatory burden on companies, which should prevent global trade from returning to normal. From the goods perspective, such uncoordinated deconfinement would subtract a total of USD1.5tn from global cross-border flows of goods until the end of 2020. This is the equivalent of imposing a worldwide tariff hike of +7pps (to around 13% average tariff) on global merchandise trade. Taking together the impact of lockdowns and the gradual uncoordinated reopening, we see the Covid-19 crisis and its consequence wiping out USD2.4tn of merchandise trade (and USD1.1tn of services trade). In total, the added damage of lockdowns and their exits would be the equivalent to a +11pps sudden hike in the world average tariff to around 17%, a level last seen in 1994. 　　Despite the U-shaped recovery, some specific sectors are at risk of seeing inflationary pressures as they are more sensitive to supply-chain disruptions (high foreign value added of exports) and their inventories stand below or close to the long-term average. Several “input prices” PMI subcomponents have soared during the past few months due to the longer delivery times and several logistic difficulties due to generalized lockdowns affecting more than half of global GDP. Looking at sectors, computer and electronics, followed by metals and mining, transportation, electrical equipment and textiles, are most at risk of continued disruption during deconfinement, given their dependency on foreign inputs as well as the level of stocks. In terms of countries, companies operating in China, the U.S., Germany, France, Ireland and Benelux could be most at risk of inflationary pressures and supply-chain disruptions as their export dependency on foreign inputs is higher compared to peers and their level of inventories below or close to the long-term average. 　　Lastly, watch out for a comeback of a pre-Covid risk: old-school protectionism, which could (i) recreate 2019 uncertainty and harm the investment recovery as U.S.-China tensions flare up and (ii) wipe out USD30bn of trade in Covid-19 related equipment, hence acting as a crisis amplifier for emerging and developing countries. The U.S. has officially stepped up its accusations against China after secretary of state Mike Pompeo reiterated previous claims linking the Covid-19 outbreak to a laboratory in Wuhan, China. This could lead the U.S. to question the Phase 1 deal, whose terms are even more challenging now that energy prices have plummeted. We estimate that China could have to buy an additonal +20% of energy products this year to comply by the deal and an additional +3.6% of agrifood products; this while growing at +1.8% this year, which is three time less than forecasted when the deal was signed. In addition, the WTO is expected to pave the way for Europe to increase tariffs in relation to the Airbus / Boeing case by the end of June. 　　Lockdowns and deconfinement have also come with increased protectionist measures on Covid-19 related products. The data show a record high level of new export restrictions on medical, pharma supplies and protective equipment (Covid-19 related products). In total, above 80 new protectionist measures were implemented on these products in 2020 around the world, a record high and 2.5 times as much as during 2019 as a whole. We estimate export bans could reduce trade in Covid-19 products by USD30bn in 2020. 　　This targeted protectionism could be an amplifier of the sanitary crisis for emerging and developing countries. Indeed, Brazil, Argentina and Algeria, followed by South Africa, Morocco, Indonesia, Colombia, Malaysia, Mexico and Chile, are countries whose imports of Covid-19 related products are heavily concentrated on three main partners, and where import tariffs on such products are higher relative to the rest of the world. 来源：安联，作者：Georges Dib，Ana Boata \t