巴黎银行：疫情改变欧元区经济走向

巴黎银行：疫情改变欧元区经济走向(2020.05.19) .zhubiaoti {font-family: 黑体;font-size:18pt;line-height:23pt; text-align:center;FONT-weight:800;color:black} .fubiaoti {font-family: 黑体;font-size:14pt;line-height:20pt; text-align:center;FONT-weight:700;color:black} .zhongwen{font-size:12pt;line-height:180%} .yingwen{font-size:13pt;line-height:150%} .tiyao{font-family: 楷体_GB2312;font-size:14pt;line-height:150%} 　　提要：欧元区经济在经历了一年半的困难期之后，原本已显示出一定韧性，甚至是企稳迹象。然而，疫情引发了需求、供给和不确定性三重冲击，从而完全改变了欧元区经济前景。疫情防控措施是保护民众的必要之举，却引发了经济衰退。欧元区货币和财政政策当局应对迅速。然而，经济复苏前景仍不明朗。这次疫情危机对欧元区经济提出了很多问题。 　　（外脑精华·北京）新冠疫情所引发的欧元区经济衰退看起来将是严重但却短暂的。欧元区经济在经历了一年半的困难期之后，原本已显示出一定韧性，甚至是企稳迹象。然而，疫情引发了需求、供给和不确定性三重冲击，从而完全改变了欧元区经济前景。疫情防控措施是保护民众的必要之举，却引发了经济衰退。欧元区货币和财政政策当局应对迅速。然而，经济复苏前景仍不明朗。 　　就在3个月前，我们和许多其他观察家一起期待着经济稳定的开始。全球和欧元区经济体都设法克服了许多挑战和不平衡，例如国际贸易紧张局势显著加剧、中国经济明显放缓、制造业困难以及某些市场估值捉襟见肘。然而，事实证明，这些因素都不足以使全球经济陷入衰退。显然，今天的情况有所不同。新冠疫情造成了巨大的冲击，这将使今年欧元区经济陷入衰退。 　　三重冲击 　　直到近期，我们通常监测的经济指标只反映了部分冲击情况。在那个阶段，新冠疫情被视为是中国独有的，并且相当遥远的现象。欧元区经济主体的预期并未立即恶化，美国经济也是如此，预测的标准差仍然很高，反映出围绕可能出现的经济情景存在相当大的不确定性。3月份采购经理人指数（PMI）的公布改变了这一局面。综合PMI从2月份的51.6降至3月份的31.4。此次暴跌的主要原因是服务业PMI突然回落，PMI创下28.4的历史新低。此前的低点可追溯到2009年2月，服务业PMI降至39.2，凸显了当前冲击的规模。这些数字证实了实时数据。 　　新冠疫情对经济来说是三重打击。首先是供应冲击，表现为工厂被迫关闭和工人短缺，他们不再前往工作场所。其他生产设施受到上游中间产品短缺的冲击，相应缩减业务量。然后是来自消费者的需求冲击。欧洲各国采取的限制措施和许多商店的关闭，打击了消费者支出。最后，仍有许多不确定因素，特别是限制措施的期限、被压抑的需求的强度和经济刺激政策的有效性。这些不确定性将阻碍公司投资，并导致预防性储蓄的增加。 　　根据经合组织的初步评估，疫情对欧元区国家的影响可能是暂时的，但影响很强烈。最初对卫生措施的冲击将导致欧洲最大经济体经济活动的实际损失在25%到30%之间。鉴于不同经济体构成的性质，对德国运输部门的影响将大于法国。 　　欧元区经济仍有相当大的不确定性，一些因素可能会加重或减弱最初的影响。这将取决于封闭措施的持续时间和短期内可能收紧的封闭措施，以及中期内收复失地的程度。例如，在“餐厅和酒店”和“休闲服务”方面的支出损失，加起来占欧元区总消费支出的12%，无法收回。因此，这将是一个巨大的损失。相反，在“衣服和鞋子”上的消费至少可以部分兑现，要么通过网络购物的替代，要么在商店重新开张后增加消费。这一部门占总消费支出的近5%。此外，消费者在封闭期间积累的“被迫”储蓄可能为强劲复苏提供了坚实的基础。然而，恢复正常的消费模式将取决于欧元区的消费者信心。然而3月份出现的信心恶化，消费者信心指数降至-11.6，那么预防性行为可能会限制复苏。 　　公共政策挑战 　　欧元区采取的公共卫生措施对经济增长有着不可避免的直接影响。届时，经济政策将发挥作用，确保强劲复苏的条件。为避免流动性短缺而采取的短期措施，需要辅之以对许多公司偿付能力的威胁的限制措施。鉴于以往危机的经验，迄今为止采取的措施看来是合乎逻辑的。因此，向公司提供短期工作设施和现金流支持看起来是明智的做法，实际上在一些国家已经采用。这些行动应减轻危机对就业和生产能力的影响。也就是说，新冠疫情冲击的规模和采取的健康措施的程度因国而异，财政对策也是如此。因此，与法国、意大利或西班牙相比，德国目前可自由支配的财政刺激要大得多。在欧洲一级，已经做出了一些决定，尽管这仍然相对有限，而且在共同的财政工具方面还没有达成共识。最值得注意的是，欧盟委员会已经启动了“一般免责条款”，因为这一冲击既具有特殊性，又不受政府控制。这一条款允许成员国通过中止规则来减损公共财政目标。换言之，现在允许各国偏离3%的名义赤字目标，或实施结构性调整。 　　欧洲央行（ECB）采取的货币政策再次促进了财政支持。欧洲央行已经宣布了大规模和灵活的措施，以应对新冠疫情的经济影响。在3月12日的货币政策会议上，拉加德已经推出了几项支持措施，特别是从现在到2020年底再增加1200亿欧元的预算。3月18日又宣布了一项紧急方案。临时大流行病紧急采购计划（PEPP），总价值7500亿欧元，可能会持续到2020年底，将限制欧元区金融环境收紧和分裂的风险。在新的发展中，最初的资产购买方案中，现有的资产购买限额将不适用于紧急方案，使其具有更大的灵活性。此外，PEPP计划将针对短期资产，从而增加对流动性问题的反应。假设每月净购买200亿欧元，欧洲央行将在2020年购买总计1000亿欧元的资产，占欧元区GDP的近10%。 　　从中期来看，新冠疫情的影响将对欧元区的实际自然利率产生持久的下行影响，如果不是负利率的话，实际自然利率已经接近于零。投资将会减少。相反，可自由支配的储蓄将增加，要么由于采取更谨慎的做法，要么因为人们将寻求重建在疫情阶段损失的资本。 　　总之，这场危机提出了许多问题。它迫使货币政策在使用非常规工具方面走得更远。下一步可能是什么？已经在讨论向经济代理人直接分配现金的可能性，但提出了重大问题，特别是从民主的角度。对各国政府来说，危机带来的必要支持，以及预期的经济活动崩溃，将增加政府赤字和债务。接下来是财政整顿吗？危机会加速欧元区的日本化吗？一旦卫生和经济紧急情况得到处理，我们将回到所有这些问题上来。 　　英文原文： 英文原文：A new, massive shock 　　The Covid-19 pandemic has triggered a recession in the Eurozone that looks likely to be deep but short-lived. After a difficult year and a half on the economic front, the Eurozone was showing some resilience and was even beginning to show signs of stabilisation. The current shock – in demand, supply and uncertainty simultaneously – has completely changed the outlook. The health measures taken- which have been necessary to protect the population from the virus- have created the conditions for a recession. Monetary and fiscal policymakers have reacted swiftly and, so far, proportionately. However, the profile of the economic recovery remains unclear and will be crucial in assessing the damage ultimately caused by the pandemic. 　　Just three months ago we, along with many other observers, were expecting the beginning of an economic stabilisation. Both the global and Eurozone economies had managed to come through many challenges and imbalances, such as the significant rise in tensions in international trade, the marked slowdown in China and the difficulties of the manufacturing sector and stretched valuations in certain markets. However none of these factors had proved sufficient to send the global economy into recession. Clearly, the picture today is different. The Covid-19 pandemic has created a massive shock, which will push the Eurozone economy into recession this year. 　　A three-pronged shock: supply, demand, uncertainty 　　Until recently, the available economic indicators that we usually monitor only partially reflected the shock. At that stage, the Covid-19 was seen as a uniquely Chinese - and thus fairly distant-phenomenon. The expectations of economic agents in the Eurozone did not deteriorate immediately, and the same was true in the US economy, where the standard deviations of forecasts is still high, reflecting the considerable uncertainty surrounding possible economic scenarios. The publication of the Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) figures for March has changed the picture. The composite PMI fell from 51.6 in February to 31.4 in March. This collapse was largely due to the abrupt fall in the service sector PMI, which hit a record low of 28.4. The previous low point, dating back to February 2009, saw the service sector PMI drop to 39.2, highlighting the scale of the current shock. These figures confirm the real-time data. 　　The Covid-19 is a triple shock for the economy. First there is a supply shock, seen in the forced closure of factories and a shortage of workers, who no longer go to their workplaces. Other production facilities are hit by the shortage of intermediate goods flowing from upstream, and scale back business volumes in response. Then there is a demand shock, coming from consumers. The confinement measures taken in various European countries and the closure of many shops automatically hit consumer spending. Finally, there are still many uncertainties, notably regarding the duration of confinement measures, the strength of pent-up demand and the effectiveness of economic stimulus policies (see below). These uncertainties will hold back company investment and lead to a build-up in precautionary savings. 　　According to the OECD’s initial evaluation3, the impact on Eurozone countries is likely to be temporary but strong. The initial shock of the health measures will lead to an overall loss of economic activity, in real terms, of between 25% and 30% in the largest European economies (relative to a normal situation). Given the nature of the composition of the different economies the impact will be greater in the transport sector in Germany than in France for example. 　　Considerable uncertainty remains, however, and several factors could accentuate or attenuate the initial effect. This will depend on the duration of confinement measures and the possible tightening of the lockdown in the short term, and the extent to which the lost ground can be regained in the medium term. For example, lost spending in “restaurants and hotels” and “leisure services”, which together account for 12% of total consumer spending in the Eurozone, cannot be regained. It would therefore be a dead loss. Conversely, spending on “clothes and shoes” is at least partially redeemable, either through the substitution of online purchases or increased spending once shops re-open. This sector accounts for nearly 5% of total consumer spending. In addition, the ‘forced’ savings built up by consumers during confinement could provide a strong base for a vigorous recovery (particularly as oil prices have fallen significantly, thus helping boost purchasing power). However, the return to normal patterns of consumer spending will depend on consumer confidence in the Eurozone. If the deterioration in confidence seen in March (The European Commission consumer confidence index fell to -11.6, the lowest figure since the end of 2014) continues, then precautionary behaviours could limit the recovery. 　　The key challenge for public policy: ensuring the best conditions for a robust recovery 　　The health measures taken in the Eurozone have an inevitable and immediate effect on growth. Economic policy will then have a role to play to ensure the conditions for a vigorous recovery. Short-term measures to avoid a shortage of liquidity will need to be backed up with measures to limit the threat to the solvency of many companies. The measures taken so far look logical given the experience of previous crises. The introduction of short-time working facilities and cash flow support for companies (through government guarantees on loans or deferred-payment deadlines for tax and social security costs) would therefore look like sensible moves, and indeed have been adopted in several countries. These actions should mitigate the impact of the crisis on employment and productive capacities. That said, the scale of the Covid-19 shock and the extent of health measures taken vary from one country to another, as do the fiscal responses. Thus the discretionary fiscal stimulus (excluding loan guarantees and payment deferrals) is currently much greater in Germany than in France, Italy or Spain. At the European level, some decisions have been taken, although this remains relatively limited and no consensus has emerged on a common fiscal tool (such as Coronabonds). Most notably, the Commission has triggered the “general escape clause” due to the shock being both exceptional in nature and out of the control of governments. This clause allows member states derogation from public finance targets, through a suspension of the rules. In other terms, countries are now allowed to deviate from the nominal deficit target of 3% or from imposed structural adjustments. 　　Fiscal support has once again been facilitated by the monetary policy adopted by the European Central Bank (ECB). The ECB has announced massive and flexible measures to respond to the economic effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. At the monetary policy meeting on 12 March, Christine Lagarde had already introduced several support measures, and in particular the creation of an additional budget of EUR 120 bn between now and the end of 2020 (in addition to the existing asset purchase programme). A further emergency programme was announced on 18 March. Worth a total of EUR 750 bn, the temporary Pandemic Emergency Purchases Programme (PEPP) is likely to last until the end of 2020 and will limit the risk of a tightening of financial conditions and of fragmentation within the Eurozone. In a new development, the existing asset purchase limits in the initial asset purchase programme will not apply to the emergency programme, giving it much greater flexibility. In addition, the PEPP will target short-dated assets, thus increasing the response to liquidity issues. Assuming net monthly purchases of EUR20 billion, a total of EUR 1000 bn in assets will be purchased by the ECB in 2020, or nearly 10% of Eurozone GDP. 　　In the medium term, the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic will have a lasting downward effect on the real natural interest rate in the Eurozone, which is already close to zero, if not negative. Investment will be reduced. Conversely, discretionary savings will be increased, either due to a more cautious approach or simply because people will seek to rebuild the capital lost during the epidemic phase. 　　In summary, this crisis poses many questions. It has forced monetary policy to go further in the use of non-conventional tools. What might the next step be? The possibility of a direct distribution of cash to economic agents is already being discussed, but raises significant questions, particularly from a democratic point of view. For governments, the support made necessary by the crisis, and the expected collapse in economic activity, will increase government deficits and debt. Will this be followed by fiscal consolidation? Will the crisis accelerate the Japanisation of the Eurozone? We will return to all these questions once the health and the economic emergencies have been dealt with. 来源：巴黎银行，作者：Louis Boisset \t