经济学人：疫情重创印度经济

经济学人：疫情重创印度经济(2020.05.26) .zhubiaoti {font-family: 黑体;font-size:18pt;line-height:23pt; text-align:center;FONT-weight:800;color:black} .fubiaoti {font-family: 黑体;font-size:14pt;line-height:20pt; text-align:center;FONT-weight:700;color:black} .zhongwen{font-size:12pt;line-height:180%} .yingwen{font-size:13pt;line-height:150%} .tiyao{font-family: 楷体_GB2312;font-size:14pt;line-height:150%} 　　提要：结束了严格封城的印度面临困境。虽然居家隔离压低了疫情增长曲线，但封城措施却不足以控制疫情扩散。随着封城的解除，印度街头与工厂的传染性将比封城之初更强。事实上，印度付出的经济代价已经超过了很多原本受疫情打击更重的国家。高盛预计，印度经济2季度折年率将萎缩45%，2020年全年将下滑5%以上，前提是下半年经济强劲反弹。印度智库全国应用经济研究协会预计，除非政府实施巨额经济刺激，否则本财年印度GDP将下滑12.5%。鉴于当前的经济困境，印度总理莫迪宣布了巨额经济刺激计划，但该计划受到了多方面质疑。 　　（外脑精华·北京）结束了连续2个月的严格封城，印度面临着困境。居家隔离规则确实压低了疫情增长曲线。因此，尽管印度人口高达瑞典的134倍，但已知的新冠疫情死亡人数却少于该国。然而，印度的封城措施却不足以控制疫情。正如一位传染病学家所说，印度更注重控制人而非控制病毒。因此，官方发布的每日死亡人数已稳步增至150人，而且还在上升。随着封城的解除，印度街头与工厂的传染性将比封城之初更强。 　　经济代价巨大 　　事实上，印度付出的经济代价已经超过了很多原本受疫情打击更重的国家。仅仅3月份，印度就有至少1.4亿劳动者失业，令全国失业率由8%飙升至史无前例的26%。大约8000万～1亿农民工在绝望中想要返回赤贫的农村。而大批印度海外劳工要么大幅减少了向国内的汇款，要么计划回国。相比之下，占就业人口10%的正式员工处境较好，但这在一定程度上是因为雇主尽可能推迟裁员的缘故。而今，正式员工被裁减的数量正在迅速增加。 　　投行高盛预计，印度经济2季度折年率将萎缩45%，2020年全年将下滑5%以上，前提是下半年经济强劲反弹。印度智库全国应用经济研究协会预计，除非政府实施巨额经济刺激，否则本财年印度GDP将下滑12.5%。 　　刺激计划受质疑 　　鉴于当前的经济困境，印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪于5月12日，政府将新增2650亿美元开支（相当于该国GDP的10%）以刺激经济。此后5天中，多名财政部官员在镜头前详细说明了这项计划的细节。 　　然而，尽管分析家预计，新增支出将使印度的中央和邦政府预算赤字升至GDP的12%左右，并令该国的债务-GDP比率达到惊人的80%，但很多人还是怀疑这项财政刺激机制难以奏效。财经日报《Mint》的一位编辑称，印度需要的是立即投入巨资刺激流通。然而莫迪政府实施的并非需求侧刺激措施，而是一系列供给侧措施，如信用担保，以及中期才能产生效力的改革举措。而且，大部分刺激措施要么属于先前宣布过的举措，要么是央行提振信贷的措施。据估算，真正的新增财政支出仅为印度GDP的0.7％～1.3%，远低于政府宣称的10%。 　　莫迪的拥护者解释说，这是为了保持政府应对能力的谨慎之举，因为印度政府预算仅为GDP的六分之一，远低于富国的水平；何况现在还不清楚危机何时结束。印度政府不是简单地给穷人发钱，而是旨在推动雇员人数最多并构成国民经济骨干的小企业增加借贷与投资。政府大大增加了农村就业计划的开支。而且，消除农产品的国内贸易壁垒、以及建立全国食品配送体系等改革措施不仅令穷人获益，而且也能节省政府资金。 　　即便如此，批评莫迪政府吝啬的并不只是左翼。印度的诺贝尔经济学奖得主阿马蒂亚·森（Amartya Sen）和阿比吉特·巴纳吉（Abhijit Banerjee）曾表示，不超过每月100美元的紧急援助可帮助很多家庭渡过危机。而印度政府所做的却是，向约2亿贫困妇女每人每月发放6.6美元，向约7000万农民每人一次性发放26美元。印度约有60%人口生活在世行认定的中低收入国家贫困线（每天3.2美元）以下，即使对这些人来说，印度政府发放的微薄援助也支撑不了多久。早在新冠疫情爆发之前，巨额坏账已对印度的支出和投资构成重压。然而，看起来印度政府和央行都希望通过鼓励贷款来重振经济。批评家认为，在上一轮借贷热潮的遗留问题尚未解决的情况下便想发动新一轮热潮，这种愿望不仅过于乐观，而且愚蠢。正如专栏作家Vivek Kaul所说，指望银行贷款加速增长纯属白日梦。 　　英文原文： Lockdown and out 　　The coronavirus is still proliferating, as are the economic consequences of attempting to slow its spread 　　Emerging from two months under one of the world’s most stringent covid-19 lockdowns, India faces a double dilemma. The stay-at-home rules did indeed bend the virus’s growth curve. This means that, so far, fewer Indians are known to have died of the disease than Swedes, even though India has 134 times more people. Yet India’s lockdown failed to bend it far enough. “We put more effort into containing the people than containing the virus,” as one epidemiologist puts it. As a result, official covid-19 deaths have risen steadily to 150 a day and are still rising. The streets and workplaces that 1.3bn Indians are returning to will be more virus-infested than when the lockdown started. 　　Already, however, India has paid a heavier economic price for the lockdown than have many countries initially hit harder by covid-19. In March alone no fewer than 140m workers are thought to have lost their jobs, catapulting the unemployment rate from 8% to an unprecedented 26% nationwide (see chart). Some 10m-80m migrants—the vagueness of the estimates speaks of the invisibility of the working underclass of street hawkers, labourers and factory hands—have despaired and tried to return to impoverished villages. Millions more Indians who work abroad have either sharply reduced their remittances or plan to return home. The 10% of the workforce in formal employment has fared better, but this is partly because employers have held off firing them for as long as possible. Only now are those cuts multiplying. 　　Goldman Sachs, a bank, expects the economy to contract by 45% this quarter at an annualised rate, and by 5% over the full year, assuming a big bounce in the second half. The National Council of Applied Economic Research, a think-tank in Delhi, predicts a contraction of 12.5% this fiscal year unless there is a huge stimulus. 　　Recognising the pain, Narendra Modi, the prime minister, on May 12th pledged an almost mythical-sounding 20 lakh crore rupees of fresh government spending, equivalent to $265bn or 10% of GDP, to reignite growth. Over the next five days a bank of finance-ministry officials faced cameras, unveiling slice after slice of measures, carefully designed to add up to Mr Modi’s magic number. 　　Yet although analysts expect the extra spending to push the budget deficits of the central government and the states to about 12% of GDP, and raise the country’s overall debt-to-GDP ratio to a wobbly 80%, many doubt that the measures will work. “What we needed was large tranches of money to go into circulation without ado,” said an editorial in Mint, a financial daily. But instead of a demand-side boost, and in particular urgent cash support for the poorest, what Mr Modi delivered was a hotchpotch of supply-side inducements and prods such as credit guarantees, along with reforms whose impact will only be felt in the medium term, at the earliest. Most of the stimulus was made up either of previously announced measures, or central bank moves to spur lending. Estimates of the actual new fiscal commitment by Mr Modi’s government range from a puny 0.7% of GDP to 1.3%, a far cry from the touted 10%. 　　Predictably, Mr Modi’s defenders explain that it is prudent to keep the government’s powder dry, considering that its budget amounts to just a sixth of GDP—far less than in richer countries—and it is not yet clear when the crisis will end. Instead of simply throwing money at the poor, the government has instead made it far easier for the small firms that employ most Indians, and form the backbone of the economy, to borrow and invest. The government has, to its credit, enormously increased spending on a rural jobs programme that Mr Modi dismissed as a boondoggle while in opposition. And such reforms as eliminating restrictions on the internal trade in agricultural goods and switching to a national, rather than state-based, system for distributing subsidised food are not just helpful to the poor, but also save the government money. 　　Even so, it is not just soft-hearted lefties who accuse Mr Modi of stinginess. Two of India’s Nobel laureates, the economists Amartya Sen and Abhijit Banerjee, had suggested that monthly emergency payments of up to $100 could help tide over many families. Instead, the sums offered so far amount to $6.60 each a month for perhaps 200m poor women, and promises of a one-off $26 apiece to some 70m farmers. Even for the 60% of Indians who survive on less than $3.20 a day, the World Bank’s poverty line for lower middle-income countries, such measly sums will not last long, much less stimulate the demand needed to generate jobs. A mountain of bad debt was already weighing on spending and investment before the coronavirus came along. Yet the government and the central bank seem to be hoping to revive the economy by encouraging lending. Critics see attempts to spur a borrowing binge before the wreckage of the previous one has been cleared away as not just optimistic, but foolhardy. “Expecting bank loans to grow more rapidly now is at best a pipe dream,” says Vivek Kaul, a columnist. 来源：经济学人 \t